Abstract-Multihoming is a popular method w e d by large enterprises and stub lSPs to connect to the lnternet to reduce cost and improve performance. Recently researchers have studied the potential benefits of multihoming and proposed protocols and algorithms to realize these benefits. They focus on how to dynamically select which lSPs to use for forwarding and receiving packets, and assume that the set of subscribed ISPs is given a priori'. In practice, a user often has the freedom to choose which subset of ISPs among all available ISPs to subscribe to, We call the problem of how to chouse the optimal set of ISPs the ISP subscription problem. In this paper, We design a dynamic programming algorithm to solve the ISP subscription problem optimally. We also design a more efficient algorithm for a large class of common pricing functions. Using real traffic traces and realistic pricing data, we show that our algorithm reduces users' cost. Next we study bow ISPs respond to users' optimal ISP subscription by adjusting their pricing strategies. We call this problem the ISP pricing problem. Using a realistic charging model, we formulate the problem as a non-cooperative game. We first prove that if cost is the only criterion used by a user to determine which subset of ISPs to subscribe to, at any equilibrium all ISPs receive zero revenue, We then study a more practical formulation in which different ISPs provide different levels of reliability and users choose ISPs to both improve reliability and reduce cost. We analyze this problem and show that at any equilibrium a n ISP's revenue is positive and determined by its reliability.
I. INTRODUCTION
Multihoming is a popular method used by large enterprises, stub ISPs, and evert small businesses to connect to the Internet 1331. A user is said to be multihomed if it has multiple external links (either to a single provider, or to different providers). According to a study by CAIDA [9] , as of June, 2004.5 1% of stub ASes are multihomed. When a multihomed user actively controls how its traffic is distributed among its multiple links, we say that it implements smart routing. Smart routing is also referred to as route optimization. or intelligent route control.
In the past few years, there has been significant research on evaluating and realizing the benefits of multihoming. yields performance improvement. In [151. Goldenberg et al. propose smart routing algorithms to distribute traffic among multiple links to optimize both cost and performance. A recent economic analysis shows that smart routing has the potential to benefit not only the end users. but also the service providers [13] . Many companies are actively developing commercial products to realize the benefits of multihoming (e.g., Internap, Aoficient, Radware, RouteScience).
Although these previous studies have made much progress in realizing the potential benefits of multihoming, two important problems remain unaddressed. First, most of the previous studies focus on how to dynamically select which lSPs to use for forwarding and receiving packets, and do not consider the ISP subscription problem (i.e., how to determine which ISPs among all available ISPs to subscribe to). Second, the freedom for users to choose ISPs introduces competitions among ISPs. ISPs will respond to users' selections by adjusting their pricing strategies. We call this problem the ISP pricing problem. While there is a large volume of literature on pricing and competition, most are based on abstract pricing models. There is no previous study on this problem using realistic Internet pricing models.
To address the above issues, we first study the ISP suhscriptinn problem. We develop an optimal algorithm using dynamic programming to minimize a user's cost. Based on the observation that many pricing functions are concave due to diminishing marginal returns, we design a more efficient algorithm for this class of pricing functions. Using real traffic maces and realistic pricing data, we show that our algorithm reduces a user' cost by up to 24% compared with a greedy heuristic, and by up to 1007~ compared with random subscription.
Next we study the ISP pricing problem. Using the realistic percentile-based charging model, we formulate the problem as a non-cooperative game. We prove that if cost is the only criterion used by a user to determine which ISPs to subscribe to, all ISPs receive zero revenue at any equilibrium. We then study a more practical formulation of the ISP pricing problem in which different ISPs provide different levels OF reliability and users choose ISPs to both improve reliability and reduce cost. We analyze this problem and show that an ISP's revenue is positive and determined by its reliability at any equilibrium. This result suggests that when users use multihoming to both improve reliability and reduce cost, the increasingly wide deployment of mu1 tihoming can be beneficial to the global Internet, since it provides incentives for the ISPs to improve their rcliability and thus benefits users.
Our key contributions can be summarized as follows:
We design a dynamic programming algorithm to solve the ISP subscription problem optimalIy. We also design a more efficient algorithm for concave pricing functions.
We demonstrate the effectiveness of the general algorithm using real traffic traces and realistic pricing data.
We study the effects of multihoming on ISPs by formulating the ISP pricing problem as a non-cooperative game using a realistic charging model. We prove that if cost is the only criterion used by a user to determine which ISPs to subscribe to, all ISPs receive zero revenue at any equilibrium.
We also study a more general formulation in which different ISPs provide different levels of reliability and users choose ISPs to both improve reliability and reduce cost. We show that an ISP's revenue is positive and determined by its reliability at any equilibrium.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 11, we describe the network and charging models. In Section 111, we propose dynamic programming algorithms to solve the ISP subscription problem. In Section IV, we study the ISP pricing problem when cost is h e only criterion. Jn Section V, we investigate a more general formulation, in which different TSPs provide different levels of reliability. In Section VI, we review related work. Finally we conclude the paper in Section VU,
NETWORK AND CHARGING MODELS
We start with a description of our network and ISP charging models. A multihomed user has multiple links to the Internet for sending and receiving traffic, as shown in Fig 1, Usually. the cost function c is a piece-wise linear (nondecreasing] function, which we will use for our design and evaluation. There are several ways in which the charging volume p can be determined. Percentile-based charging and total-volume based charging are both in common use.
A. Network Model
In this paper, we focus on percentile-based charging. This is a typical usage-based charging scheme currently in use by many ISPs [271. Under this scheme, an ISP records the traffic volume a user generates during every 5-minute interval. At the end of a complete charging period, the q-th percentile of all 5-minute traffic volumes is used as the charging volume p for q-percentile charging. More specifically, the ISP sorts the 5-minute traffic volumes collected during the charging period in ascending order. and then computes the charging volume p as the traffic volume in the (q% x I)-th sorted interval, where I is the total number of intervals in a charging period. For example, if 95th-percentile charging is in use and the charging period is 30 days, then the cost is based on the traffic vohme sent during the 820841 (95% x 30 x 24 x 60/5 = 8208) sorted interval .
THE ISP SUBSCRIPTION PROBLEM
In this section, we first develop optimal algorithms to solve the ISP subscription problem. Then we demonstrate the effectiveness of OUT algorithms using real traffic traces and realistic pricing data.
A. Problem Formulation
The ISP subscription problem can be stated as follows:
Given a set K = (1: . . . , K } of ISPs with cost functions CI; and charging percentiles q k , where k E K, find a subset S K: of ISPs that minimizes the user's total cost Ekes ck(pk), where PI; is the charging volume of ISP 6 . Formally, Compared with the cost optimization problem formulated in 1151, the ISP subscription problem is different in that Cl51 assumes that the ISP subscription decision has already been made, so all ISPs can be used, while in our ISP subscription problem the user has the freedom to select a subset of ISPs to use in order to minimize cost. A user can benefit from selecting a subset o f the ISPs if the ISPs charge non-zero base prices. 2 the constraint in (61, so p k r = p , and pk = 0: V k f k ' is an optimal solution to (61.
B. A Dynamic Programning Algorithm
Given the above lemma, we observe that if all cost functions ck are concave, then for any subset S = { 1,. . . , n} of ISPs, the user's totd cost c ( p l , . .. : p n ) = E!=, c k ( p k ) is also concave. Applying Lemma 1 to the second case of (4), we have that the minimum occurs either when y = 0 or y = y.
Therefore, we do not need to search for y all the way from 0 to p . Instead, we only need to compare the user's total cost when y = 0 with that when y = p . This leads to a new recurrence relation shown in (5). Notice that now, in order to compute C ( K ! K,qt(V, 1 -z ) , z), instead of having to compute C( n, k , p , 2 ) for all p values as in (4), we only need to compute C ( n , k , p , z ) values for p'= qt(V, 1 -z ) and p = 0. Therefore, a dynamic programming algorithm based on the recurrence relation in (51 has time complexity O(K'2) and space complexity O( A Z ) , which are both polynomial.
R. Greedy Subscription
The greedy algorithm chooses a set of k ISPs, denoted as S,, as follows. In the first iteration, it examines all ISP sets with size no larger than T (T 5 k ) , and selects the one which yields the lowest cost. In the second iteration, it searches for a new ISP to add which in conjunction with the ISPs already picked yields the lowest cost. It iterates until k ISPs have been chosen. Here T is a tuning parameter of the algorithm. and all ISP sets with size no larger than r are exhaustively searched. If r = n, all subsets are searched, and hence the solution i s optimal; however. in this case, its complexity is much higher than the dynamic programming algorithm. Using different values of T can trade off running time for solution quality. In our evaluation, we set T = 1.
Proof:
Ck=lp~T c ( P e k * ) = c(pel;*). In addition, per;. also satisfies
E. Random Subscriprion
The random subscription algorithm randomly chooses a specified number of ISPs under the constraint that the total bandwidth of the subscribed ISPs is large enough to accommodate the user's traffic. In our evaluation, we run the random subscription algorithm 20 times and report the average.
E Eilaluatians
In this subsection. we evaluate the performance of our ISP it is also consistent with the pricing functions we are aware of ( e.g., [4], E241). We refer readers to 1151 for more details. The subscription cost is computed based on the 95th percentile of the subscriber's traffic during each month. We compare our optimal subscription algorithm against the random subscription algorithm and the greedy subscription algorithm. In our first set of experiments, we assume that the user knows its traffic volume in advance. Fig. 3 compares the total cost incurred using the three subscription algorithms as we vary the number of ISPs the user subscribes to. We present here the results using traces obtained in December 2003. Results using other months' traces show the same relative ranking of the three algorithms. Random subscription continues to do much worse than the optimal, while the difference hetween the greedy and the optimal algorithms is much smaller.
We make the following observations. First. as expected, our optimal subscription algorithm yields the lowest cost in all cases. The random subscription algorithm incurs ahout 50% higher cost on average for both traces, and leads to over 100% higher cost in worst cases. especially when subscribing to a small number of 1SPs. The greedy subscription yieIds similar cost to the optimal algorithm in most cases, but could result in tt5 up to 24% higher cost in worst cases. Second, we observe that ' adding ISPs initially helps reduce the total cost; as the number 0 5 of ISPs increases further, the cost increases. To explain this, we note that an ISP's cost involves two components: base charge and usage-based charge. Adding ISPs initially helps to In our second set of experiments, we study the case where the user does not know its traffic a priori, but predicts one month's traffic based on the previous month's traffic and applies the three subscription algorithms to the predicted traffic. We call this scheme predicted subscription. We compare the results with the optimal subscription that knows traffic in advance. We present the results using trace obtained in We observe that ow optimal subscription algorithm using predicted traffic performs fairly well. It performs close to rhe optimal algorithm under perfect knowledge about traffic patterns, and much better than the random subscription algorithm. In most cases, uncertainty in traffic pattems yields less than 5% cost increase on average for the optimal subscription algorithm. The greedy algorithm performs close to the optimal in most cases, but could lead to 24% higher cost in the worst case.
Although our evaluation shows that the greedy subscription algorithm performs reasonably well in most cases, it is worth noting that its worst case approximation ratio is unbounded for T < n -1, as shown below. Consider T + 2 ISPs that are available for subscription, and they all use 100-th percentile charging with the following pricing functions, The optimal subscription cost 'is (T + 1)B. In comparison, the greedy algorithm first selects ISP 1, since all other ISP sets of size within T have higher cost. Its final subscription is no less than A, since ISP 1 is included in the final selection. So the ratio between the greedy solution and optimal solution is no less than A / ( r + 1)B, which is unbounded. The above analysis can easily be generalized to the case of more than T + 2 available ISPs by having c j ( p ) = 3A for j > r f 2.
To summarize, in this section we develop a dynamic programming algorithm for solving the ISP subscription problem, and demonsuate its effectiveness using real traffic traces.
IV. THE ISP PRICING PROBLEM Our ISP subscription algorithm allows users to choose a subset of ISPs to subscribe to and minimize their costs. In response, ISPs may adjust their prices to maximize their revenue. How ISPs will adjust their prices is an interesting question because it helps us understand the evolution of Internet multihoming In this section, we formulate the problem as a non-cooperative game and prove that, if cost is the only criterion used by a user for ISP subscription, all ISPs receive zero revenue at any equilibrium.
A. Problem Formulation
To make our game theoretical analysis more realistic, we use the realistic percentile-based charging model in our formulation. Using this model makes our analysis more involved, but we believe the results can be more relevant. In our formulation, we focus on the case where multiple ISPs compete for a single subscriber. Hereafter, we use subscriber and user interchangeably. We assume a special structure of pricing functions: ISP , k receives revenue by charging the subscriber Ck = akpk + b k if it is selected by the subscriber, and 0 otherwise. Here al; is the unit price; p k is the charging volume determined by the charging percentile Qk and time series of the subscriber's traffic assigned to ISP k; and bk is the base price.
We now define the game formally. The players of the game are a set K = {1:2, ..., K } of ISPs. The Finally, we explicitly make the following assumptions in the analysis below:
We assume that each feasible set has equal probability of being selected by the subscriber. We also assume that when the subscriber is multihomed to a feasible ISP set S, the aggregated charging volume traffic p ( S ) is distributed evenly across those ISPs with minimum unit price. We assume that each of Ihe ISPs has enough capacity to accommodate all of the subscriber's traffic, and h a t the total amount of traffic that the subscriber generates is bounded. We also assume that each ISP only charges a finite price and can adjust its unit price and base price in an infinitesimal amount. We assume that there is perfect informatian sharing among the subscriber and ISPs; that is, each of them has perfect information about the others when making decisions.
B. Summary of Results
Our analysis based on the percentile-based charging model is quite involved. In the interest of clarity, we first summarize our results and the structure of our analysis. The main result of this section is that an action profile of the ISP pricing problem is an equilibrium if and only if all ISPs rece.ive zero revenue in the outcome. It is obvious that any action profile with an outcome in which all ISPs receive zero revenue is an equilibrium of the game, since if an ISP unilaterally increases its price, the subscriber can always switch to other ISPs that charge zero; thus the revenue of the ISP is not increased.
The remaining challenge then is LO prove that all ISPs receive zero revenue at any equilibrium. We first show that at any equilibrium, either all ISPs receive zero revenue or dl of them receive positive revenue. There does not exist an equilibrium in which some ISPs receive zero revenue while others receive positive revenue. Therefore, we only need to show that there does not exist an equilibrium with positive revenue for all ISPs. which we call a positive-revenue equilibrium. To do so, we derive the following properties that a positive-revenue equilibrium should have. We first show that a subscriber is not able to free-ride all providers (pay only the base price). and that any feasible ISP k must have a unit price equal to the maximum of all positive minimum unit prices of all of the feasible sets containing ISP I;. at any positiverevenue equilibrium. We then show that a feasible ISP can reduce its unit price by a small amount without introducing any new feasible set with the same minimum cost. We then prove that any ISP k in a feasibk set must have the unique minimum unit price in that set. Using these properties, we prove that there exists no positive-revenue equilibrium.
C. Equilibrium Analysis
We consider an arbitrary ISP k. Without loss of generatity,
we assume k appears in feasible sets ZiE~l,,,,,~k}. Note that there must exist at least one such set thus IVk 2 1. Also, there are hiLk 2 0 feasible sets that do not contain I;, and The above theorem tells us that there does not exist an equilibrium in which some ISPs receive zero revenue while others receive positive revenue. Now we only need to show that there does not exists an equilibrium with positive revenue for all ISPs. Therefore, in the remaining part of this subsection, we consider only these positive-revenue equilibria.
Next we show the first property of a positive-revenue equilibrium: the subscriber is not able to free-ride all providers at a positive-revenue equilibrium. Therefore, ak = a if a > 0 at a positive-revenue equilibrium.
1
The above lemma shows that a feasible ISP I; is not able to increase its revenue by increasing its unit price. However, it is still unknown if it is possible for ISP k to increase revenue by reducing its unit price. We show below (Lemma 4) that a feasible ISP can reduce its unit price by a small amount such that all feasible sets remain unchanged; based on this lemma, we then prove by contradiction that a feasible ISP can reduce its unit price by a smalI amount to increase its revenue, if that unit price is not the unique minimum (Lemma 5). Consider three cases as follows.
case 1: uk -E is not the minimum unit price in set 2.
case 2: ak -E is the minimum unit price while a k is not.
Then we can reduce E such that al; -6 is no longer the minimum unit price and this case degenerates to case 1.
case 3: both al; -6 and a k are the minimum unit price.
Then we have j k = pk 1 0 (we have equality here because p ( 2 ) 2 0); therefore, c ( 2 ) = c'(Z) > cmin.
Let € 2 denote the appropriate E value for a set Z satisfying the above conditions. Therefore, we can always find an c by taking the minimum of all E Z . Finally, we prove the property of any equilibrium based on neorem 2: At any equilibrium, every ISP k has zero the preceding lemmas.
revenue. Pro08 Proof by contradiction. By applying Theorem 1, we know that there can be only two possible cases: (1) RI; = 0,V'k E IC, or (2) Rk > 0,Vk E IC.
Therefore. we only need to prove that the second case does not show up in any equilibrium.
For an arbitrary ISP k. Rk > 0, ISP k must be in some feasible set. We next consider the case where ISP I; is in some feasible set. Specifically, we examine the following two cases:
By applying Lemma 5, a~; = a is the unique minimum unit price in dl of the sets SiE{l,.,.,~kl. Therefore, all the sets with non-zero minimum unit price can have only one single ISP. Then we only need to consider N > 1 since when N = 1 it is trivial to show that each ISP k has zero revenue. Since cmzn > 0, we are always able to find a 6 < diction.
Note that in this case bk = 0. because otherwise the subscriber can dump all traflic to the ISP with zero unit price in S, without using ISP I;, which means that Rk = 0 and leads to contradiction. Therefore, ISP k is not in $:Vi E (1 ,..., nk}. By the assumption Rk > 0, ISP k should be in any feasible set since the subscriber can assign free-riding traffic to ISP I; (by making charging volume zero) without incurring any extra cost. Therefore, all feasible sets containing I;
should have zero minimum unit price and k is in all of these sets; otherwise. it contradicts with our assumption that U = 0.
Therefore, we prove that all lSPs receive zero revenue at any equilibrium if cost is the only criterion used by a user to determine which subset of ISPs to subscribe to.
fi-1 -c,,,in such that Rk > Rc. This leads to a contra-2) a = 0.
v. RELIABILITY AND THE IsP PRlClNG PROBLEM
We have shown in the previous section that if the only difference among lSPs is pricing, then all ISPs receive zero revenue at any equilibrium. However, in reality, pricing is not the only difference among ISPs, and cost is not the only concern of subscribers, either. Subscribers also consider many other factors, e.g., reliability, ease of management, and security. In particular, reliability is a major motivation for the depIoyment of multihoming.
Given the importance of both cost and reliability, we investigate a more realistic formulation of the ISP pricing problem: how ISPs respond to multihomed subscribers when the subscribers optimize both cost and reliability.
A. Problem Formulation
Similar to the previous section, we formulate the problem as a non-cooperative game. We consider the percentile-based charging model and focus on the case where multiple ISPs compete for a single subscriber. The players, action spaces, and ISPs' revenue-maximization objectives are the same as those of the previous section.
The major difference between this formulation and the preceding formulation is that we consider both cost and reliability.
Specifically, the subscriber takes advantage of our subscription algorithm and smart routing algorithms to minimize cost and maximize reliability. To characterize the objective of the subscriber. we define a utility function of the subscriber on a subset S of ISPs as follows:
where ~k is the instantaneous failure rate of ISP k , ??bk = is the mean time between failures (MTBF) of ISP k, and w > 0 is the weight of the subscriber's preference of reliability over cost. We consider finite constant mean time between failures in this paper. The weight w reflects how much the subscriber is concerned with reliability. The higher the weight is. the more the subscriber prefers reliability over cost. The subscriber's objective is to choose a subset of ISPs such that its utility is maximized: maxSEzd tu CkcS logmk -CkES Ck. We assume thal the subscriber always chooses as many ISPs as possible when maximizing its utility, e.g., when the subscriber has equal utility over multiple feasible sets of ISPs, the subscriber prefers to multihome to ISPs in the largest set in order to improve reliability. Note that our formulation and approach can be easily extended to consider other metrics that subscribers are concerned with.
Analysis of E.xistence and Non-uniqueness of Equilibritiin
Given our non-cooperative game-theoretic formulation, we will prove the existence and non-uniqueness of equilibrium of the game in this section. The intuition of our proof is that no matter how ISPs change their charging parameters, the subscriber excludes a particular ISP k from subscription if thal ISP charges more than w log nzk, because the subscriber's utility becomes less if ISP I; is included in subscription. Formally, we have the following theorem stating the existence and non-uniqueness of equilibrium: 
Therefore, no matter how a k and 41; change, the subscriber's utility is always maximized by using all ISPs as providers, while ISP b cannot increase its revenue by setting bb = bl;.
bk > b k . The subscriber has the option to choose from two possible feasible sets S and S -(IC} in this case.
Note that we implicitly apply our previous assumption that the subscriber chooses as many ISP as possible when maximizing its utility. Specifically, the subscriber has the same utility on any subset of S -{k}. Similarly, we know that the subscriber can always distribute the traffic in such a way that akp; = 0 no matter how ISP k changes ak and qk. We compute the difference of utilities on S and S -(k} as follows:
Therefore, the subscriber chooses 5'-(k} as the feasible set, and ISP k receives zero revenue by increasing b k . Therefore, we have found an equilibrium. Furthermore, it is obvious to see that { U I , = 0, q k = 0.95, bk = 'U log m k ) is another equilibrium. Therefore, there exist multiple equilibria.
I

C. Properties of Equilibria
Given the results of existence and non-uniqueness of equilibria, we consider a more challenging and important problem in this subsection: what properties does an equilibrium have? In particular, we are interested in understanding how the revenue is distributed across ISPs at an equilibrium.
We first show that every ISP has positive revenue at any equilibrium by proving Theorem 4. We summarize our intuition of the proof as follows. Any ISP k can attract the subscriber's subscription by charging the subscriber with some Next, we show that the revenue an ISP receives at any equilibrium is determined by both its own reliability of services and the weight of the subscriber's preference of reliability. Specifically, we prove the following theorem: fieorern 5: At any equilibrium, RI; = w log mk, V k E li.
Pmo$ Theorem 3 shows that there exist (non-unique) equilibria, where RI, = w log mk, V k E IC. We now prove that this property indeed holds for every equilibrium.
The proof follows from the fact that if an ISP I; charges the subscriber Rk < wlogmk, then it must be included in all of the feasible sets of the subscriber, because by including ISP k in the feasible set, the subscriber always increases its utility.
Suppose at an equilibrium, a particular ISP I; charges the subscriber Kk < w log nzk, then ISP k can increase its charge by a small positive amount S. As long as Rk + d < wlogmk, ISP k can be sure that it will be included in all of the feasible sets of the subscriber. Thus ISP k can increase its revenue to Rk + 6, which contradicts with our equilibrium assumption.
On the other hand, suppose that at an equilibrium, a particular ISP k charges the subscriber Rk > eulog71ik if the subscriber uses ISP k as a provider. This leads to a contradiction:
ISP k receives zero revenue because the subscriber has higher utility by excluding ISP k from the feasible set; however, ISP k can increase its revenue by charging the subscriber w log mI;
if the subscriber takes it as a provider. This contradicts with our equilibrium assumption. Note that here we assume that the subscriber uses as many ISPs as possible when there are multiple utility-maximizing feasible sets.
A couple of comments follow. First, by considering both reliability and cost, we show that ISPs receive positive revenue in the competition; therefore, new providers have incentives to join the competition and share the total revenue.
Second, at any equilibrium, an ISP's revenue is jointly determined by that ISP's reliability and the subscriber's weight of preference. Therefore. ISPs have incentives to improve their reliability by upgrading their networks. On the other hand, the subscriber also benefits from the competition among ISPs. By adjust relalive preference between reliability and cost, a subscriber can trade reliability for cost, or vice versa. Our results indicate that the wide deployment of multihoming can be beneficial to the global Internet, since it provides incentives to ISPs to improve their reliability. charging models, while our work studies the percentile-based charging model which is widely used by today's ISPs. We believe analysis using a realistic charging model can provide much needed insight in understanding the implications of multihoming.
VI. RELATED WORK
VTI. COXCLU~ION
In this paper. we study two related problems -which subset of ISPs a user subscribes to to minimize cost, and how ISPs respond to the user's selection by changing their pricing strategies. Our results show that a user can apply the dynamic programming algorithm to effectively reduce its cost. In response to users' cost optimization, ISPs will adapt their pricing strategies. Using the percentile-based charging model which is widely used by today's ISPs, we formulate the pricing problem as a non-cooperative game. Our results show that if cost is the only criterion used by a user to determine which ISPs to subscribe to, at any equilibrium all ISPs receive zero revenue. To be more practical, we consider &he-case where differenl ISPs provide different levels of reliability, and users choose ISPs to both improve reliability and reduce cost. In this case, at any equilibrium an ISP's revenue is positive and determined by its reliability.
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